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Abstract—The urging need for seamless connectivity in mobile
environment has contributed to the rapid expansion of Mobile IP.
Mobile IP uses wireless transmission medium, thereby making
it subject to many security threats during various phases of
route optimization. Modeling Mobile IP attacks reasonably and
efficiently is the basis for defending against those attacks,
which requires quantitative analysis and modeling approaches
for expressing threat propagation in Mobile IP. In this Paper,
we present four well-known Mobile IP attacks, such as Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attack, bombing attack, redirection attack and
replay attack and model them with Stochastic Game Petri
Net (SGPN). Furthermore, we propose mixed strategy based
defense strategies for the aforementioned attacks and model
them with SGPN. Finally, we calculate the Nash Equilibrium
of the attacker-defender game and thereby obtain the steady
state probability of the vulnerable attack states. We show that,
under the optimal strategy, an IDS needs to remain active 72.4%,
70%, 68.4% and 66.6% of the time to restrict the attacker’s
success rate to 8.5%, 6.4%, 7.2% and 8.3% respectively for the
aforementioned attacks, thus performing better than the state-
of-the-art approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication has witnessed a massive growth in
number of users in the recent years. Spreading of wireless net-
works has influenced everyday life, from e-governance [1] to
social networks [2], from digital automation [3] spreading up
to space and aeronautical networks [4]. One of the key benefits
of wireless technology is mobility, which allows mobile users
to move from one network to another while maintaining their
home IP address unchanged [5]. Mobile IP (RFC 2002) is a
standard protocol established by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) that builds on the Internet Protocol by making
mobility transparent to applications and higher level protocols
like TCP. Mobile IP settings mostly exist in wireless networks
where users need to carry their devices across several networks
with different IP address. 3G and 4G networks also use Mobile
IP to provide transparency when user of the internet migrates
between cellular towers [6]. Mobile IP allows the mobile node
to use two IP addresses: a fixed home address and a care-
of address that changes at each new point of attachment.
Now a days, a vast number of devices are facilitated with
Mobile IP that includes Cellular phones, PDAs, GPS, Tablets
and other handheld devices. More and more entities getting
connected to the wireless networks, the security threats that
causes massive impairment are bulging as well. Abundant of
malicious nodes that have been thrust into networks across
the world have made the detection of Mobile IP attacks more
difficult. Network security, in particular Mobile IP security
needs to provide confidentiality, availability and integrity for
data communication. However, the need to provide unbroken
session as the user or node moves from one link to another
without human intervention and non-interactivity has created
the scope for the attackers to perform various attacks in Mobile
IP. Our study focuses on understanding and modeling the
following Mobile IP attacks and their appropriate defense
strategies: (1) Denial of Service attack, (2) Redirection attack,
(3) Replay attack and (4) Bombing attack. All of the attacks
are mostly due to route optimization between the Mobile
Node and Corresponding Node. Mobile Node that changes
its IP address needs to update its care-of-address and send the
binding update to the Corresponding Node. Binding updates
are vulnerable to various attacks since Malicious Node can
penetrate the route between Mobile Node and Corresponding
Node. Attacker can steal information, alter it or redirect it
by fooling either Corresponding Node or Mobile Node or
both. Researchers have tried to analyze Mobile IP attacks and
their defenses using various approaches like using IPSec [7],
number of independent data networks [8], nondisclosure
method [9], IP security primitives [10], [11], authenticating a
mobile node [12], using public-key [13], security association
policy server [14] or securing binding update [15]. However,
none of the above mentioned works attempted to model and
analyze the attacks and defense scenarios using Stochastic
Game Petri Net (SGPN). To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the first attempt to model attacks and defenses in
Mobile IP using SGPN.
Our Contributions. This paper presents the following contri-
butions:
• Attack Analysis. Analyze Mobile IP and four major
attacks such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, bombing
attack, redirection attack and replay attack present in
Mobile IP.
• Attack Modeling. Model the attacks using stochastic
game petri net (SGPN).
• Defense Modeling. Propose mixed strategy based de-
fense strategies for the aforementioned attacks and model
them with SGPN.
• Evaluation. Evaluate the models by calculating the
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Fig. 1. MIPv6 Architecture
steady state probability of the vulnerable attack states and
show that, an IDS needs to remain active 72.4%, 70%,
68.4% and 66.6% of the time to restrict the attacker’s
success rate to 8.5%, 6.4%, 7.2% and 8.3% respectively
for the aforementioned attacks. .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the background of the work. Section III analyzes the
previous works. Section IV illustrates the attacks modeling and
our proposed solutions to the attacks, Section V deals with the
findings and result analysis and finally Section VI concludes
the paper with a highlight on the scope of future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Mobile IP
IP address is obtained from a TCP connection which
uniquely identities a device/node’s point of attachment to the
internet. When a device moves from its home network to a
new foreign network, it needs to change its IP address and re-
establish a new TCP connection. If there is an ongoing session
going on with this device, the session needs to be disconnected
until a new IP address of a moving device is obtained. Mobile
IP Protocol was proposed by a working group within the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in order to solve this
mobility issue. Mobile IP for IPv4 is described in IETF RFC
5944, and extensions are defined in IETF RFC 4721. Mobile
IPv6, the IP mobility implementation for the next generation
of the Internet Protocol, IPv6, is described in RFC 6275.
1) Mobile IP Overview: Mobile IP designed by IETF is
a standard protocol to enable mobile users to move across
the network while maintaining their permanent IP address.
IP datagram can be routed over Internet transparently using
Mobile IP. Each mobile node has a Home Address (HoA)
that corresponds to its home network that remains unchanged
regardless of its current location. If a node moves to foreign
network, it is associated with a Care-of Address (CoA), that
provides information of its current location. Using Mobile IP,
the device can change its location across various networks
without requiring to change its IP address. Home Agent
(HA) and Foreign Agent (FA) are the routers that perform
the encapsulation and decapsulation of the datagram packets
respectively.
2) Mobile IP Terminologies: Now we present the most
common terminologies used in Mobile IP.
• Mobile Node (MN): A moving device that connects to
the internet using a fixed home address and can change
the location and point of attachment to the internet while
keeping ongoing communication uninterrupted. Examples
of MNs are Cellular phones, PDAs, GPS, tablets, routers
and other handheld devices.
• Home Network (HN): Network within which a MN
identifies its home address.
• Home Address (HoA): An IP address assigned to MN
for a home network that remains same regardless of where
the device is attached to the internet.
• Home Agent (HA): A router on the MN’s home network
that tracks the MN’s current location (CoA), intercept,
encapsulates and tunnels datagram packets to the MN
when it is away from home.
• Foreign Network (FN): Any network other than the
MN’s home network, on which MN moves its point of
attachment.
• Care-of-Address (CoA): A temporary IP address as-
signed to a MN while it is visiting a foreign network
away from its home network.
• Foreign Agent (FA): A router on the MN’s foreign
network that provides a CoA to the MN and acts as a
default router for datagram generated by the MN. It also
decapsulates and delivers datagram to the MN that are
encapsulated by the MN’s HA.
• Correspondent Node (CN): A mobile or stationary
device that sends or receives packets to or from the MN.
• Binding Update (BU): Message used to notify the HA
or CN about the current location of the MN by sending
the CoA.
3) Mobile IPv6: In MIPv6, the Mobile Node (MN) can
communicate in two ways with the Corresponding Node (CN),
through bidirectional tunneling and through route optimiza-
tion, see figure 1. In bidirectional tunneling, packets from the
CN are sent to the HA, which forwards them to the MN
through a tunnel. The MN sends the responses through a
reverse tunnel to the HA, which forwards the data to the CN.
Communication between MN and CN thus always happens via
HA. Whenever, MN changes its network and moves to a new
network, it gets a new CoA. MN needs to notify HA about its
new CoA and this is done through Binding Update (BU).
Route Optimization. It is possible to bypass the require-
ment of HA for every packet transfer through the use of
route optimization. When route optimization is enabled, any
communication after the initial connection through the HA is
handled directly between the MN and the CN. A type 2 routing
header is used for this process. Since communication occurs
directly between MN and CN instead of detouring via the HA,
it becomes more efficient because routing can be optimized.
However, in order to use route optimization, CN must have
Mobile IPv6 support on it. Similar to bidirectional tunneling,
MN needs to notify CN about its new CoA through BU. Route
optimization is one of the main benefits of Mobile IPv6 over
Mobile IPv4.
Return Routability. In order to prevent redirection attacks
during the exchange of BU between MN and CN, an authenti-
cation test is needed. This authentication process is called the
return routability procedure and lets the CN test whether the
MN is actually reachable via both its CoA and its HoA. If the
authentication is successful, only then are BU accepted by the
CN.
B. Stochastic Game
A stochastic game is a n-player game in which players
payoff and the probability distribution of a new state being
visited depend on the collection of actions that the players
choose, together with the current state. A Stochastic Game is
represented as a 7-tuple vector SG = (I,X,Ai, A, ri, q, β),
where
(1) I = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of players;
(2) X = {1, 2, ..., N} is the state space;
(3) Ai is the finite action set of player i;
(4) A := A1 × ...×An is the set of action profiles;
(5) ri : X ×A→ R is the reward function of a player i;
(6) q(x′ | x, a) is the probability of next state being x′
given that the current state is x and the action profile
a ∈ A;
(7) β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor.
C. Petri Net
Petri net (a.k.a. place/transition net) is a mathematical and
graphical modeling language for the description and analysis
of concurrent processes in distributed systems. A Petri net
is a directed bipartite graph consisting of places, transitions
and arcs. Places denote conditions which are represented
by circles. Transitions denote events which are represented
by rectangular bars. Arcs run from a place to a transition
or vice versa. Arc never runs between places or between
transitions. Petri Net is very similar to State Transition
Diagrams. Graphically, places in a Petri net may contain a
discrete number of tokens. Marking M is the state of the
net at any time in terms of the distribution of tokens over
the places. Transitions may be fired to transfer control from
input place to output place through the exchange of tokens.
A firing is an atomic event.
III. STOCHASTIC GAME PETRI NET (SGPN)
We now present the formal representation of Stochastic
Game Petri Net (SGPN) which is derived from [16]:
SGPN. A SGPN is represented as a 9-tuple vector
SGPN = (N,P, T, F, pi, λ,R, U,M0), where
(1) N = 1, 2, . . . , n is the set of players;
(2) P is a finite set of places;
(3) T = T 1 ∪ T 2 ∪ ... ∪ TN is a finite set of transitions,
where T k is the set of transitions with respect to player k
for k ∈ N ;
(4) pi : T → [0, 1] is a routing policy representing the
probability of choosing a particular transition;
(5) F ⊆ I ∪ O is a set of arcs, where I ⊆ P × T and
O ⊆ T ×P such that P ∩T = φ and P ∪T 6= φ, where φ
is an empty set; we denote x = {y | (y, x) ∈ F} the preset
of x, similarly, x = {y | (x, y) ∈ F} the post-set of x;
(6) R : T → (R1, R2, ..., Rn) is a reward function for the
players taking each transition, where Ri ∈ (−∞,+∞), i ∈
N ;
(7) λ = {λ1, λ2, ..., λw} is a set of transition firing rates
in the transition set, where w is the number of transitions;
(8) U is the utility function of players; and
(9) M0 is the initial marking.
Each token S is assigned a reward vector
h(s) = (h1(s), h2(s), ..., hn(s)) as its property, where
hk(s) is the reward of player k in token s. Players get the
reward R(t) after the firing of the transition t, and the reward
is recorded in the reward vector h of the token [16]. For the
sake of simplicity and to fit our attacker-defender model, we
assume that our stochastic game is a two-player discounted
stochastic game.
Definition 1 (Transition Probability Matrix). Given a
SGPN with r places, a Transition Probability Matrix is a
r × r matrix M, where Mij represents the probability of a
transition tk being fired such that pi is the input place, pj is
the output place and pi, pj ∈ P, tk ∈ T .
Definition 2 (Strategy). Given a player k in SGPN,
strategy is a vector pik = (pi(tk1), pi(t
k
2), ..., pi(t
k
wj)), where
pi(tkj ) is the probability that player k takes action tj and
wj =| T k |.
Definition 3 (Utility). Given a SGPN in infinite
time horizon with n players, utility of a player i is
U i(p, pi) =
∑∞
k=1 β
k−1Rki (p, pi), where pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., pin),
β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor and Rki (p, pi) is the expected
reward function of player i at the k-th stage of the game. It
can be further simplified to U i(pi) when p denotes the initial
state of player i.
Definition 4 (Nash Equilibrium). Given a SGPN, a Nash
Equilibrium for a two-player stochastic game is a vector profile
pi∗ = (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2 , ..., pi
∗
n) such that U
i(p, pi∗) ≥ U i(p, pii, pi∗−i)
for all p ∈ P, i ∈ N , where pi∗−i is any alternative mixed
strategy of player i except pi∗.
Thoerem 1. Every discounted stochastic game is guaranteed
to have a Stationary Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Let, F i = (f i1, f i2, ...f in) be the set of stationary
strategies for player i.
A Stationary Nash Equilibrium belongs to the class of
strategy profiles F 1 × ... × Fn. We need to prove that, there
exists f∗ = (f∗1 , f
∗
2 , ...f
∗
n) ∈ F := F 1 × ... × Fn such that
U i(p, f∗) ≥ U i(p, pii, f∗−i) for all p ∈ P, i ∈ N .
We note that F is a compact convex set in some Euclidean
space. We also observe that U i(p, .) is continuous on F .
We get,
(fk1 , f
k
2 , ...f
k
n)→ (f1, f2, ...fn) as k →∞
=⇒ U i(p, fk1 , ..., fkn)→ U i(p, f1, ..., fn) (1)
Equation (1) follows directly from the formula:
U i(f1, ..., fn) = (N − βQf1...fn)−1Ri(f1, ..., fn)
where Q denotes the probability of the next state given
the current state.
Claim. A policy f∗ = (f∗1 , f∗2 , ...f∗n) is a Nash Equilibrium
if U i(., f∗) satisfies the following optimality equation:
U i(p, f∗) = Ri(p, f∗) + β
∑
x∈P U
i(x, f∗)Q(x | p, f∗) for
all p ∈ P and i ∈ N .
IV. RELATED WORK
Inoue et al. [10] present an implementation example of
a secure mobile system which employs a secure mobile IP
protocol on stationary security gateways and mobile hosts by
modifying IETF standard Mobile IP protocol with IP security
primitives, which control the packet flow from a mobile host
through multiple security gateways.
Braun et al. [11] describe a solution called secure mobile
IP (SecMIP) to provide mobile IP users secure access to
their company’s firewall protected virtual private network by
making a slight adaptation of the end system communication
software in order to adapt the mobile IP and IP security
protocol implementations to each other.
Leung [12] provides methods and apparatus for authenti-
cating a mobile node by configuring the server to provide a
plurality of security associations associated with a plurality of
mobile nodes.
Zao et al. [13] present the design and the implementation
of a public key management system called Mobile IP Security
(MoIPS) built upon a DNS based X.509 Public Key Infrastruc-
ture and the innovation in cross certification and zeromessage
key generation that can be used with IETF basic and route
optimized Mobile IP.
Yokote et al. [14] present a solution to asynchronous se-
curity association between nodes by implementing a security
association policy server for IPsec in third generation and
beyond wireless mobile access, Internet protocol-based digital
networks supporting Mobile IP.
Deng et al. [15] point out the weaknesses of two solutions
proposed by the IETF Mobile IP Working Group and present
a new protocol for securing binding update messages in order
to defend against redirection attack.
Hossain et al. [17] explain with illustrative examples major
security threats and several existing security solutions on
various components of the network involving the mobility and
identified additional security holes of these existing solutions
and propose some simple mechanisms to counter them.
Lin et al. [18] propose Stochastic Game Nets (SGN) to
model and deal with the game issues, which takes advantages
of both stochastic game theory and Stochastic Petri Nets
by inheriting the flexible modeling approach of Stochastic
Petri Nets. They also apply the SGN method to model and
analyze the network attacks, compute the Nash Equilibrium
and best-response strategies to defend the attacks. A number
of researchers [19]–[27] have proposed game-theory based
solutions for network security problems. However, Lin et
al. [18] propose Stochastic Game Nets (SGN) to model and
deal with the game issues, which takes advantages of both
stochastic game theory and Stochastic Petri Nets by inheriting
the flexible modeling approach of Stochastic Petri Nets. They
also apply the SGN method to model and analyze the network
attacks, compute the Nash Equilibrium and best-response
strategies to defend the attacks. Wang et al. [16], [28] later
extended this work by applying it to the security analysis
for enterprise networks. Our work extends the work of [16],
[28] but differs in the fact that while they applied Stochastic
Game Net (SGN) to model attacks in enterprise networks, we
apply Stochastic Game Petri Net (SGPN) to model attacks and
defenses in Mobile IP.
V. SGPN REPRESENTATION
We represent our SGPN models according to the following
graphical rules: Each place in the Petri Net is represented
by the round red colored circles with having the label inside
the circle. Each transition in the Petri Net is represented by
rectangular red colored shapes with having label placed inside
the rectangle. All the arcs are represented by the directed
arrows resembling the actual arcs. Figure 2 shows an example
how the Petri Nets are converted in the SGPN.
Fig. 2. Conversion of SGPN from Petri Net
VI. ATTACK MODELING
A. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
Denial-of-Service (DoS) is an attack that makes a device
or web resource temporarily or indefinitely inaccessible to its
Fig. 3. DoS Attack
authorized users. In Mobile IPv4, DoS attacks is performed
by the preclusion of packets from flowing between two nodes.
DoS attacks are very common in target sites or services hosted
on high-profile web servers such as business sites, credit card
payment gateways, banks, and even root name servers. DoS
attack is also possible in IPv6. Since the IPv6 support is on
par with the IPv4-based feature set, attacks can be carried out
over IPv4, and by shifting over to IPv6 it is possible to bypass
the defenses that only inspect IPv4 traffic. Generally saying,
DoS attack takes the following steps:
• In order to initiate the attack, the attacker stays on
the path between two nodes to perform the preclusion
of packets flowing between them by intercepting the
communication between the two nodes directly.
• When a mobile node is connected on the foreign network,
it must use the registration request to inform its home
agent of its current care-of address. Home agent intercepts
and tunnels all the traffic destined to mobile nodes home
address to its Care-of-Address (CoA).
• During the attack, the attacker creates a bogus Registra-
tion Request, specifying his own IP address as the CoA
for the mobile node.
• If the mobile node’s home address is fooled by this fake
registration request, all packets would be tunneled to the
attacker instead of mobile node’s actual CoA. Thus, the
connection to the mobile node is lost.
B. Redirection Attack
Redirection attack is a type of attack in which the intended
traffic for the MN is redirected by the attacker through
sending a fabricated BU, thus depriving MN from getting
data. To launch the redirection attacks, the IP addresses of the
Place Description
State 1 Attacker is ready to attack.
State 2 Attacker has created bogus registration.
State 3 Attacker’s fake request is accepted by MN.
Transition Description
Create bogus reg Attacker is creating a bogus registration.
Send Fake Req Attacker is sending the fake registration request to MN.
Tunnel Packet to Attacker MN is fooled by the fake request.
Data is tunneled to attacker instead of MN.
TABLE I
DOS ATTACK PLACE AND TRANSITION DESCRIPTION
Fig. 4. Redirection Attack
communicating nodes has to be known by the attacker. Hence,
nodes with well-known IP addresses, such as file servers,
public servers and DNS servers are more vulnerable to such
attacks. The attack takes place in the following steps:
• The attacker sends a fake binding update message to CN
claiming that the MN has changed its care-of address due
to its movement to a new location.
• If the BU is not authenticated, it will be accepted by the
CN. CN will now start sending packets to the new CoA
which is fake and the MN will not get any traffic.
Place Description
State 1 Attacker is ready.
State 2 Attacker has collected IP addresses of MN and CN.
State 3 Attacker has created fabricated BU.
State 4 CN has updated binding cache using wrong IP address.
State 5 CN is ready to send data.
State 6 CN has sent data to wrong CoA.
Transition Description
Collect IP Addresses of MN & CN Attacker is collecting IP addresses of MN & CN.
Create Fabricated BU Attacker is creating fabricated BU.
Req to Update Binding Cache Attacker is requesting to update the binding cache with
it’s fake BU.
Send Data to New CoA CN is sending data to wrong CoA.
Back to Ready CN is getting back to ready to send data again.
TABLE II
REDIRECTION ATTACK PLACE AND TRANSITION DESCRIPTION
Fig. 5. Bombing Attack
Place Description
State 1 Attacker is ready to attack.
State 2 Attacker has established TCP connection with streaming server.
State 3 Attacker has obtained data packets from streaming server along with
sequence numbers.
State 4 CN updates the binding cache with wrong BU.
State 5 CN (Streaming Server) is ready to send data.
State 6 Victim MN has received unsolicited stream of data from streaming server.
Transition Description
Create TCP/IP Connection Attacker is creating a TCP/IP connection with server.
Request for streaming data Attacker is requesting for streaming data from streaming server.
Send fake BU to Server Attacker is sending fake BU to server specifying that it has changed
its location.
Send data to new CoA CN, in this case the streaming server is sending data to victim’s IP.
TABLE III
BOMBING ATTACK PLACE AND TRANSITION DESCRIPTION
C. Bombing Attack
Bombing attack is an attack where large amount of un-
wanted data traffic is redirected to the victim node to degrade
its performance as well as bandwidth wastage. The attacker
may exploit real-time streaming servers for this kind of attack.
The attack is performed through the following steps:
• First, the attacker establishes a connection with streaming
server, and request to download a large stream of data.
• Once the server accepts the request, the attacker starts to
get the data along with the sequence number of the data
packets. After getting the initial sequence number, the
attacker might claim that it has moved to a new location.
The attacker uses the IP address of the victim MN in the
binding update.
• As a result, subsequent packets from the server will
be directed to the victim node causing its performance
degradation and bandwidth wastage of the MN.
D. Replay Attack
Replay attack is a type of attack that takes the advantage of
a previously recorded binding update by replaying it when the
Fig. 6. Replay Attack
Place Description
State 1 MN is ready.
State 2 Attacker is ready.
State 3 MN’s IP is changed due to change of its location.
State 4 Attacker has sent a fake BU which was recorded before.
State 5 MN has sent the BU to the CN.
State 6 CN has updated the binding cache with attacker’s BU.
State 7 CN is ready to send data.
State 8 CN has sent data to updated wrong CoA.
Transition Description
MN ready MN is becoming ready to interact with CN.
Obtain new IP MN is obtaining a new IP because it has changed its location.
Send Previously Saved BU MN is sending BU to CN.
MN req to update BU MN is requesting to update binding cache with its BU.
Attacker req to update BU Attacker is requesting to update binding cache with its BU.
Send data to new CoA CN is sending data to fake CoA.
Get Back to Ready CN is getting ready to send data again.
TABLE IV
REPLAY ATTACK PLACE AND TRANSITION DESCRIPTION
victim (MN) moves to some new location, thereby disrupting
the communication between the CN and the MN. Replay
attack works by the following steps:
• The attacker stays in close proximity to the MN or CN,
for example being in the same radio access network.
Thus, the attacker has the ability to record any BU send
by the MN to the CN.
• When MN moves to a new network, it sends a BU to the
CN. The attacker listening to such BU records the BU to
use for replay attack in future.
• When the MN moves to another new location, the attacker
replays the recorded BU to the CN to trick CN. If
the CN accepts such replay message, it would start
sending packets to the old address thinking that MN
has again moved to the old address. Thus, traffic from
CN are redirected to a non-existing IP-address, thereby
interrupting the communication to the MN.
Fig. 7. DoS Defense
Place Description
State 1 Attacker is ready to attack.
State 2 Attacker has created bogus registration.
State 3 Attacker’s fake registration request is submitted to CN.
State 4 MN’s authenticate request is accepted by CN.
State 5 MN is ready to send registration request.
State 6 Attacker’s authentication is failed and attack is not done.
Transition Description
Create bogus reg Attacker is creating a bogus registration.
Send Fake Req Attacker is sending the fake registration request to MN.
Send Reg Req MN is sending valid registration request to CN.
Successfully Authenticate CN is successfully authenticating the registration request of the MN.
Tunnel Packet to MN CN is tunneling packet to MN.
Fail to Authenticate CN is unsuccessfully authenticating the registration request
of the attacker.
TABLE V
DOS DEFENSE PLACE AND TRANSITION DESCRIPTION
VII. DEFENSE MODELING
A. Denial of Service (DoS) Defense
The defense for the DoS attack is simply to prevent bogus
registrations by the attacker. This can be done by imposing
strong authentication on in all registration traffic exchange
between a mobile node and its home IP agent. Under the
assumption that the shared secret key is protected, this can
insure that the traffic intended for mobile node is inaccessible
to the attacker. All implementation of Mobile IP supports the
default algorithm MD5 for authentication, however mobile
node and home agent can use any authentication algorithm
they agree upon.
B. Redirection Defense
In order to defend against the redirection attack, CN should
authenticate the BU before updating it. CN should send data to
the new location only when the BU is authenticated. Another
mitigation to this problem could be frequently changing the IP
address by the communicating nodes. However, this is imprac-
tical since this additional security mechanism will make the
mobility protocol slower and more complex. Brief description
about the states and the transitions for solution scenario of
redirection attack are given below-
Fig. 8. Redirection Defense
Place Description
State 1 Attacker is ready.
State 2 Attacker has collected IP addresses of MN and CN.
State 3 Attacker has created fabricated BU.
State 4 CN has received requests to update binding cache.
State 5 CN is ready to send data.
State 6 CN has failed to authenticate wrong BU and attack is failed.
Transition Description
Collect IP Addresses of MN & CN Attacker is collecting IP addresses of MN & CN.
Create Fabricated BU Attacker is creating fabricated BU.
Req to Update Binding Cache Attacker is requesting to update the binding cache with
it’s fake BU.
Fail to Authenticate BU CN is failing to authenticate attacker’s fake BU.
TABLE VI
REDIRECTION DEFENSE PLACE AND TRANSITION DESCRIPTION
C. Bombing Defense
For defending against bombing attack, server can send a
hello packet to the new location and wait for the acknowledge-
ment. After receiving acknowledgement from the new location,
server will send the desired data to MN. Thus, bombing
attack can be prevented. However, one possible problem of
this defense is that, the attacker can spoof acknowledgement
to the server as it knows the initial sequence number making
a continuous flow of data streams sent to the victim. One
possible solution of this could be to use the TCP RESET
signal by the victim node to immediately stop such flow of
data stream.
D. Replay Defense
In order to defend against the replay attack, CN should
authenticate the BU before updating it. However, it is very
difficult to defend against replay attack since the attacker is
already using some authenticated BU. On possible solution
for this problem is to use the sequence number as the authen-
tication parameter. CN should store the sequence number of
the previously send binding updates in a stable storage. CN
Fig. 9. Bombing Defense
Place Description
State 1 Attacker is ready to attack.
State 2 Attacker has established TCP connection with streaming server.
State 3 Attacker has obtained data packets from streaming server along with
sequence numbers.
State 4 CN updates the binding cache with wrong BU.
State 5 CN (Streaming Server) is ready to send data.
State 6 Victim MN has received unsolicited stream of data from streaming server.
State 7 Victim MN has sent TCP RESET and attack is failed.
Transition Description
Create TCP/IP Connection Attacker is creating a TCP/IP connection with server.
Request for streaming data Attacker is requesting for streaming data from streaming server.
Send fake BU to Server Attacker is sending fake BU to server specifying that it has changed
its location.
Send data to new CoA CN, in this case the streaming server is sending data to victim’s IP.
Send TCP RESET Victim MN is sending TCP RESET signal to CN.
TABLE VII
BOMBING DEFENSE PLACE AND TRANSITION DESCRIPTION
should send data to the new location only when the BU is
authenticated and the sequence number is not repeated.
VIII. EVALUATION
We now evaluate our modeling approach by calculating the
steady state probabilities of the attack and defense scenarios.
We compare the infection probability of the attacks and
our proposed defense scenarios. We use simulation technique
using MATLAB to get the probability values and for plotting
Place Description
State 1 MN is ready.
State 2 Attacker is ready.
State 3 MN’s IP is changed due to change of its location.
State 4 Attacker has sent a fake BU which was recorded before.
State 5 MN has sent the BU to the CN.
State 6 CN has received requests to update the binding cache.
State 7 CN is ready to send data.
State 8 CN has failed to authenticate fake BU and attack is failed.
Transition Description
MN ready MN is becoming ready to interact with CN.
Obtain new IP MN is obtaining a new IP because it has changed its location.
Send Previously Saved BU MN is sending BU to CN.
MN req to update BU MN is requesting to update binding cache with its BU.
Attacker req to update BU Attacker is requesting to update binding cache with its BU.
Authenticate BU CN is authenticating the BU send by the attacker.
TABLE VIII
REPLAY DEFENSE PLACE AND TRANSITION DESCRIPTION
Fig. 10. Replay Defense
the simulation data. We use algorithm 1 to calculate the steady
state probability from the Nash Equilibrium.
Algorithm 1 Evaluate SGPN Model
1: Let, {A1a,A2a},{A1n,A2n},{D1d,D2d} and {D1n,D2n}
be the reward values for the attacker’s attack, attacker’s
not attack, defender’s defend and defender’s not defend
actions respectively.
2: PA ← Attacker’s probability of Attacking
3: PD ← Defender’s probability of defending
4: Calculate NE← {PA, PD} by solving the following:
5: PA ×A1a + (1−PA)×A1n = PA ×D1d + (1−PA)×D1n
6: PD ×A2a+(1−PD)×D2d = PD ×A2n+(1−PD)×D2n
7: Mr ← Reduced attack-defend model
8: Generate reachability tree, Tr from the attack-defend
model, Mr
9: Calculate steady state probability, pi using Tr and NE
10: We can say that, if defender defends PD% of the time,
the probability of a successful attack is pi%
In the simulations, we have used the following reward
values for the attacker and defender that can be summarized
in Table 11.
A. Steady State Probabilities
We now calculate the steady state probabilities of the attack
models. For that we have generated the reachability trees
from the models. For the simplicity of calculation, we have
reduced the models by keeping the attack-defend states and
removing the non attack-defend states. Figure 12 shows an
example of the reduced attack-defend model of the replay
attack defense. Figure 13 shows the reachability tree generated
from the attack-defend model of the replay attack defense.
Fig. 11. Reward Summary used in attack simulations
Fig. 12. Attack-defend model for Replay Defense
Fig. 13. Reachability Tree from attack-defend model
Using the reward values from Figure 11 for replay attack,
we can calculate the Nash Equilibrium for the replay attack
defense. Plugging in the values, A1a = −0.3, A1n = 0.6, D1d =
0, D1n = 0, A
2
a = −.15, D2d = −.15, A2n = −0.6, D2n = 0,
we get the NE = {0.25, 0.6667}. By using the reachability
tree and NE probabilities, we get the following steady state
probabilities {pi9, pi10, pi11} = {0.75, 0.08333, 0.16667}. From
the above calculations, we can say that if the defender defends
66.67% of the time, the probability of a successful attack is
only 8.333%.
In a similar fashion, we calculate the NE and steady state
probabilities of the remaining attacks: DoS attack, bombing
attack and redirection attack. We find the values of PD as
0.724, 0.70 and 0.684 respectfully. From these, we find the
values of steady state probabilities as 0.0857412, 0.0642 and
0.07287 respectively. Thus, we can conclude that under the
optimal strategy, an IDS needs to remain active 72.4%, 70%,
68.4% and 66.6% of the time to restrict the attackers success
rate to 8.5%, 6.4%, 7.2% and 8.3% for the Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attack, bombing attack, redirection attack and replay
attack respectively.
B. Comparison with state-of-the-art approach
Our model performs better than many state-of-the-art ap-
proaches for intrusion detection in wireless networks using
game theory. Though the other researchers have performed
their analysis in a slightly different contexts, we believe our
work is comparable to them. For example, Ma et al. [29]
has shown that their approach can detect the attacker in 70%
to 85% of the cases. In other words, the attacker is able to
perform successful attacks in 15% to 30% cases. In our case,
on average the attacker is able to perform successful attack
only in 7.6% of the cases. In other words, IDS can detect the
attacker over 92% of the cases. Similar comparisons can also
be drawn with other intrusion detection approaches modeled
with game theory.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In our works, SGPN bring together the Game Theory and
the Stochastic Petri Nets, and thus takes the gains of both
stochastic game theory and Stochastic Petri Nets. It is our
strong believe that the proposed SGPN approach can unwrap
a new possibility to deal with the security issues in wireless
and communication networks. We show that under the optimal
strategy, our model can restrict the attackers success rate to
8.5%, 6.4%, 7.2% and 8.3% for the Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack, bombing attack, redirection attack and replay attack
respectively. The IDS needs to remain active only 72.4%, 70%,
68.4% and 66.6% of the time to achieve such performances.
Future networks will rely on autonomous and distributed archi-
tectures to improve the competence and suppleness of mobile
applications, and our SGPN provides the ideal framework for
designing efficient and robust distributed algorithms.
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